On March 18, 2009 the House Foreign Affairs Committee held its third hearing in an ongoing investigation into the proper role of the military in the government’s foreign assistance efforts.  Committee Chair Howard L. Berman (D-CA) set the direction for the discussion by asking “And what are the implications of putting a military face on development and humanitarian activities?  How does this affect the way we are viewed in the world, and what is the practical impact on USAID’s ability to carry out development projects?”

Witness testimony indicates increased emphasis on security and use of the military role has created problems, especially for U.S. nonprofits that get foreign assistance grants, but that there are no easy solutions.  The outcome of these deliberations will likely shape revisions in the Foreign Assistance Act.

Tension over the purpose of foreign assistance appears to be at the heart of the issue.  Dr. Reuben Brigety II, Director of the Sustainable Security Program at the Center for American Progress Action Fund described them as follows:

  • Fundamental assistance: “sees improving the lives of beneficiaries as an end in and of itself. It may have the residual benefit of supporting American interests by promoting regional stability and global prosperity, but those geostrategic considerations are at best secondary to the performance of the activities.”
  • Instrumental assistance: “sees improving the lives of beneficiaries as a means to some other tactical or strategic end.”

Brigety told the committee that, although there are times the military is the best vehicle for quick response in a fundamental assistance situation, “there are a series of disadvantages with the military’s involvement in assistance missions. First, the focus on the performance of programs of tactical or strategic value can mean assistance efforts are directed to places of the greatest potential threat rather than places of the greatest human need. This would be in contravention of essential humanitarian principles of humanitarian action.”

Next he notes that “the military’s growing involvement in this space risks the appearance of “militarization” of America’s foreign assistance….It also has real operational consequences in the field when implementing partners refuse to cooperate with the military, or are reticent to work with USAID, for fear of being linked to US foreign policy and losing their operational neutrality.”

These concerns were echoed by the testimony of Nancy Lindborg, President of Mercy Corps, an international humanitarian and development organization working in 37 countries affected by conflict.  She said “A chronic under-investment in civilian capacities has led to an over-reliance on military solutions and military tools…”  In addition, the military has pushed more a greater role, beginning in November 2005 when the Pentagon issued Directive 3000.05, which put “stabilization and reconstruction operations on a par with the military’s traditional kinetic operations. Although a key provision notes that many stability tasks are best performed by civilian actors, Directive 3000.05 also emphasizes the need for DOD to play these roles when civilian capacity does not exist.”

Lindborg testified that the consequences have been harmful.  “When the lines blur between military and civilian actors, insecurity can increase for civilians.”  The ability to provide aid and security for relief workers is dependent on being perceived as independent from the military.  She gave an example about members of a Danish NGO operating in Faryab, Iraq who were warned by a community that their safety was in jeopardy because of government relations.  “When NGOs are associated with the military, we are more likely to be perceived as a legitimate target, and so have a greater vulnerability. Our value and ability to work in insecure environments is thus further compromised,” she added.

According to the testimony of former USAID Administrator Philip Christenson simply shifting resources from defense to civilian agencies will not solve the problem.  He described legal constraints on USAID operations and administrative problems that should be addressed.  Calling for a more comprehensive strategy, he said, “If we want to defend the role of the civilian agencies, the path to that objective is country ownership of the American assistance activities in that country. State and the foreign aid agencies (not just USAID) need to negotiate with the governments of the countries, especially with the democratically elected governments, and reach a common strategy and a detailed plan for US foreign assistance from all sources. There is no problem with DOD being part of the plan.”

Retired Marine Corps General Michael Hagee also recommended “smart power as the strategic triad of the 21st Century—the integrated blend of defense, diplomacy and development. But this strategic approach will only be effective if all three smart power pillars are coherent, coordinated, and adequately resourced.”

“The World Bank reports that the crisis is driving as many as 53 million more people into poverty as economic growth slows around the world, on top of the 130-155 million people pushed into poverty in 2008 because of soaring food and fuel prices. This rise in global poverty and instability is complicating our national security.”  Hagee sees an opportunity to increase our national security and prosperity by responding to this burgeoning global crisis by enhancing our aid and development programs.  He said, “Strengthening our development and diplomatic agencies and programs will not only reduce the burden on our troops, but will stimulate economic growth which will increase international demand for US goods and products – and in turn will create American jobs. It is in our nation’s self-interest to make a larger investment in global development and poverty reduction.”