On June 21, 2010, the same day the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that bans training in nonviolent dispute resolution as support to listed terrorists groups, a Congressional report was released saying U.S. taxpayer dollars are being funneled from the U.S. army contractors to insurgents, including the Taliban. What sense does it make to punish humanitarian groups who want to train terrorist groups to turn away from violence, but knowingly allow millions of dollars to flow uninterrupted to a designated terrorist group the U.S. military is battling everyday in Afghanistan?
Background on Convoys in Afghanistan
Feeding, fueling, and arming nearly 100,000 American troops[1] and vehicles at over 200 bases[2] and outposts across the region are major logistical challenges. To address some of these issues, the Department of Defense (DoD) has almost entirely outsourced its responsibility for protecting its supply chain to local truckers and private security providers. While this is not an uncommon military practice, the report finds the outsourcing of security forces has triggered “a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan officials, and perhaps others.” Additionally, it says with the absence of U.S. security forces it is not always clear “what happens to the trucks carrying U.S. supplies between the times the trucks leave the gates” and arrive at their destinations.
The report, which follows a six-month investigation, found that eight contractors[3] control about 70 percent of the transportation business in Afghanistan.[4] Since mid-2009, military hired contractors have completed over 40,000 missions.[5] Convoys, which can contain up to as many as 300 trucks,[6] are frequently attacked en route to their destination. It is a common practice in the region to arrange for convoy protection by paying local leaders, many of whom control large private militias. Next, the report finds, is that these men in turn make payments to their superiors, so that much of the money becomes a “significant potential source of funding for the Taliban.” This is a violation of DoD regulations[7] and may be undermining the overall U.S. effort to defeat the insurgency, fight corruption, and build an effective Afghan government.
The Report’s “Shocking” Findings
According to the report, Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, “a good portion” of a $2.16 billion[8] transportation budget used by DoD contractors to pay for safe transport of goods throughout the region has possibly found its way to the Taliban. The contractors “pay tens of millions” of dollars for privately owned security in what “amounts to a protection racket,” the report said. The report also uncovered that the private militias extort money from the primary contractors by attacking convoys that have not paid for protection. It is widely believed that these militias pay protection money to insurgent groups. Protection payments can be as much as $15,000 per truck.[9] An Afghani chief responsible for providing convoy security told investigators that his monthly ammunition expense was $1.5 million.[10]
Speaking at a House subcommittee about the report’s findings on June 22 Congressman John F. Tierney (D-MA), who described the report’s findings as “shocking,” said the payments made throughout the transport contract process “has fueled warlordism, extortion, corruption, and maybe even funded the enemy.” He said what began as a “cost-effective expediency” to transport food, water and other goods to U.S. military bases by civilian contractors has turned into “a dangerous shortcut.”[11]
Interviewing U.S. military personnel and local hired contractors, investigators found that U.S. military officials in the region have “virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided” and that the Pentagon “has been largely blind to the potential strategic consequences of its supply-chain contingency contracting.” The report said:
The evidence shows that Department of Defense officials received a drumbeat of complaints about the [contractor’s] role in corruption, warlordism, and even aid to the enemy. Unfortunately, as demonstrated in dozens of documents and interviews, a dismissive attitude about these grave allegations was prevalent throughout.
In response to an early story on protection payments going to insurgents, Colonel Wayne Shanks, the chief public affairs officer for [International Security Assistance Force], acknowledged that military officials were “aware of the allegations that procurement funds may find their way into the hands of insurgent groups, but we do not directly support or condone this activity if it is occurring.” Colonel Shanks added that, “the relationships between contractors and their subcontractors, as well as between subcontractors and others in their operational communities, are not entirely transparent.”
Other examples of DoD indifference and inaction toward serious reports of money being funneled to the Taliban include:
Absence of Logic & A Call for Correction
The disconnect between the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project case that upholds a law inviting prosecution of individuals who try to turn designated terrorist groups away from violence and the DoD’s turning a blind eye to millions of dollars being funneled to warlords and insurgents is glaring.
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts said providing terrorist groups with “material support in any form furthers terrorism” and “helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups.” If this decision can be reached in a case about teaching listed groups how to use international law to resolve disputes without violence, what would he think about the cash protection payments from DoD to insurgents? The contrast between the two situations only highlights the need for Congress and the administration to re-examine the laws applicable to peacebuilding activities by civil society organizations.